Data: 21 de novembro de 2024.

Horário: 15h

Local:  sala 249 do bloco A – IME

Seminário Híbrido: https://meet.google.com/skq-uguh-jey

Resumo

In Public Goods Games (PGG), the temptation to free-ride on others’ contributions poses a significant threat to the sustainability of cooperative societies. Therefore, societies strive to mitigate this through incentive systems, employing rewards and punishments to foster cooperative behavior. Thus, peer punishment, in which cooperators sanction defectors, as well as pool punishment, where a centralized punishment institution executes the punishment, is deeply analyzed in previous works. Although the literature indicates that these methods may enhance cooperation on social dilemmas under particular contexts, there are still open

questions, for instance, the structural connection between graduated punishment and the monitoring of public goods games. Our discussion is on a compulsory PGG framework under panoptical surveillance. We are going to present novel mathematical models to enhance, including one that scrutinizes the balance between the severity and scope of punishment to catalyze cooperative behavior. We will discuss how well-calibrated punishment and discipline schemes, leveraging the panoptical effect for universal oversight, can effectively mitigate the free-rider dilemma, fostering enhanced cooperation.

We will also discuss some practical situations in community projects where the technique can be used. In addition, we will challenge the audience with some open situations to give more confidence to the model and use data-driven modeling.

This work is co-authored by Rocio Botta and Gerardo Blanco and partially supported by CONACYT.